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Abstract
This research is an empirical assessment of the causal relationship between
democracy and birth rates. The question under study is whether a country is
more likely to experience fertility declines as it becomes more democratic, hold-
ing the other country’s characteristics constant. This study goes beyond the
existing literature to establish a causal relationship between democratization
and fertility declines. To establish a causal relation we adopt two complemen-
tary strategies. The first is to include country fixed effects in the estimation and
the second is to use an instrumental variables approach. The results suggest
a robust negative causal relationship between democracy and birth rates. We
interpret the effect of political rights on fertility as stemming from a decrease
in overall societal risk, which diminishes as political institutions mature.
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1 Introduction
The world economies have experienced an unprecedented demographic transforma-
tion, characterized by a significant reduction of fertility rates and population growth,
over the past decades. The persistent decrease in fertility rates is depicted in Figures
1 and 2. These figures show a simultaneous sharp decline in fertility levels to a record
level.
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Figure 1 – Crude Birth Rate Evolution by Region
Notes: For detailed data definitions and sources see the Appendix Table A1.
Various mechanisms have been pointed as triggers for fertility declines and the
reduction of population growth that characterized the world in the past century. Galor
(2005) presents an assessment of the main determinants of fertility declines advanced
by demographic transition theories. The author points four main mechanisms to
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Figure 2 – Crude Birth Rate Evolution by Income Level
Notes: For detailed data definitions and sources see the Appendix Table A1.
explain the reduction in fertility experienced across the various regions of the world.
One of the highlighted mechanisms is the rise in the level of income per capita and
the substitution effect of quality for quantity of children, explained by relative higher
wages paid to women in developed economies, therefore increasing the opportunity
cost of child rearing (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, 1990)1. Galor (2005) argues that
this theory is counterfactual since countries across Western Europe with consider-
ably different income per capita observed a simultaneous demographic transition and
1Becker (1981) suggests that the demographic transition occurs since at high levels of income
the positive income effect on child bearing is dominated by the negative impact of the opportunity
cost of children. Fernandez-Villaverde (2004) studies the demographic transition in England and
demonstrates that in contrast to the Becker’s theory, which says that an increase in income would
lead to fertility declines, a rise in income would have resulted in a further increase in fertility rates.
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therefore, the role of high levels of income in explaining fertility declines is limited.
A second mechanism relies on the role of human capital accumulation. Galor
and Weil (1999, 2000) proposes that the acceleration of technological progress and
its impact on the demand for human capital contributed to the onset of the demo-
graphic transition through two main effects. First, technological improvement allow
households to spend a higher portion of resources in child quality as well as in child
quantity. And second, it allows these increased resources to be reallocated towards
higher investment in human capital for each child2.
A third mechanism to explain fertility declines is the decline in the gender gap.
The rise in women’s relative wage and education associated with a higher female
labor market participation leads to fertility declines as women’s time becomes more
expensive and the opportunity cost of rearing children increases. Galor and Weil
(1996, 1999) proposes a theory of fertility decline associated with a decrease in the
gender wage gap. More recently, Lagerlöf (2003) proposes that as women’s human
capital becomes more similar to that of men, making their time more expensive,
couples substitute quality for quantity in children and fertility falls as a consequence3.
The last mechanism pointed by this author is the decline in infant and child mortal-
ity. Galor (2005) argues that this explanation is inconsistent with historical evidence
since the increase in income per capita in the Post-Malthusian Regime increased the
desirable number of surviving offspring and so fertility rates increased significantly, de-
spite the decline in mortality rates. The quantitative analysis by Fernandez-Villaverde
(2004) and Doepke (2005) suggest that the decline in infant mortality rates was not
a determinant of fertility declines during the demographic transition.
Other mechanisms such as the old-age security hypothesis which suggests that
in the absence of capital markets parents see children as assets that allow them to
smooth the consumption over lifetime are also present in the literature. With the
2Other factors can be pointed as underlying this second mechanism. The new role of human cap-
ital in the production process induced education reforms (see, for example, Galor and Moav (2003,
2004)) and laws to abolish child labor (see, for example, Doepke and Zilibotti (2003)) contributing
to a decrease in child labor and, as a consequence, on fertility rates. The increase in the expected
length of productive life as a result of the rise in life expectancy increased the potential rate of return
of investments in children’s human capital. The cultural and genetic evolution of individuals’ prefer-
ences towards the quality of children triggered the investment in human capital and the substitution
of quality for quantity of children, reinforcing fertility declines.
3See, for example, Rahim and Tavares (2011) for a more recent study.
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establishment of capital markets this hypothesis looses power since this motivation
for rearing children becomes residual.
These theories of demographic transition are unanimous on the relation between
the number of children parents decide to have and the opportunity cost of childbearing,
but the majority have remained silent on the institutional conditions that contribute
to change the relative costs and preferences of having children, thus reinforcing fertility
declines.
We argue that politics critically influence the environment within which individ-
uals make childbearing decisions. The argument is that the country’s political en-
vironment is a determinant of fertility decisions by changing the opportunity cost
of having children. We follow the political economy literature, namely Tavares and
Wacziarg (2001), Rodrik, Subramnian, and Trebbi (2004) and Persson (2005), and
argue that democracies encourage an open debate about policies and policy-makers,
a regular scrutiny and a meaningful opposition preventing power abuses and lowering
uncertainty about future policies. The improvement in economic performance and the
lower uncertainty associated with democracies both increases the opportunity cost of
children and promote fertility declines. Democracies promote a more stable economic
environment by enhancing property rights and favoring contract enforcement, thus
increasing the returns to investment in physical and human capital.
In this framework, this paper investigates the role of democracy in explaining
fertility declines experienced worldwide on the last decades. The starting point of this
study is the cross-country empirical evidence on the relationship between democracy
and fertility rates. We revisit these studies and focus on the within variation rather
than on the cross-sectional variation to establish a causal relationship. The question
we want to address is whether a country is more likely to observe fertility declines as
it becomes more democratic, holding other country characteristics constant.
The cross-sectional empirical evidence on the negative relationship between democ-
racy and birth rates is established ignoring three very important issues. First, and
importantly, there is the potential for omitted variable bias. The political economy
literature, for example Huntington (1991), pointed the importance of cultural values,
traditions, institutionalization, and ideologies in explaining democratization. These
factors are also likely to be correlated with birth rates behavior. Democracy may proxy
for an important combination of these factors. Recent work by Acemoglu, Johnson,
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Robinson, and Yared (2005, 2008) shows that two basic tenets of the modernization
thesis, popularized by Lipset (1959), which says that richer and more educated nations
become more democratic, are not robust to the introduction of country fixed effects.
Empirical evidence that more educated and richer nations are more democratic van-
ishes once the authors control for omitted permanent factors.
Second, these studies ignore the high persistence in birth rates and do not con-
sider any dynamics in the estimated models. We will use dynamic panel data meth-
ods in order to deal with persistence in birth rates while accounting for unobserved
individual-specific effects. Since the variable Crude Birth Rate is highly correlated
over time it is crucial to model dynamics in order to disentangle and better understand
which factors influence the individual’s behavior over time.
And third, there is the possibility of reverse causality, with economies with very
young population contributing to democratic transitions. The young population struc-
ture has been emphasized as a trigger for the Arab Spring that started in the late
months of 2010 in the Arab World (namely in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya)4.
To answer the question under study taking these issues into consideration seems
overwhelming. However, we find that two estimation methods are well suited to
deal with these problems. The first is the fixed effects estimation, which allows for
unobserved country individual heterogeneity that may be correlated with exogenous
regressors, and the second is the instrumental variables estimation. The first method
allows us to control for time-invariant country-specific factors5 which affect both vari-
ables, and to look at the ”within-country variation” instead of simple cross-country
comparisons. The second approach to estimate the relation between democracy and
birth rates relies on the use of instrumental variables which is a promising way of deal-
ing with endogeneity. We use a measure of the neighbors democratic capital proposed
by Persson and Tabellini (2006) as an instrument for democracy.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the variation in the democracy index and in the logarithm of
income per capita, respectively, against the variation of the logarithm of Crude Birth
4For example, according to the United Nations Population Division, in 2010, 19% of the tunisian
population aged between 15 and 24 years old in 2010. This young structure of the tunisian population
is pointed as a very important factor for the precipitation of the Tunisian revolution which began in
December 2010 that is commonly referred as the Youth Revolution.
5If the omitted factors affecting birth rates and correlated with the political and economic variables
are time-variant then the fixed effects estimation does not help to improve inference.
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Rates, over the period of 1972-2006. In contrast with income per capita, no clear
relation between democratization and birth rates can be drawn directly from Figure
3.
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Figure 3 – Democratization and Fertility Rates: 1972-2006
Notes: Variation corresponds to the total difference between 2006 and 1972. The red line
represents a fitted OLS line of the variation of the logarithm of CBR on the variation of the
democracy index. The green line is fitted by a nonparametric regression using the locally
weighted scatterplot smoothing estimator (lowess). See the appendix table for data definitions
and sources.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents related literature. Section 3
presents the data. Section 4 introduces the econometric methodology used. Sections
5 and 6 discuss the empirical results and empirical robustness. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Literature
Demographers, political scientists and economists provide theoretical backgrounds to
explain the fertility declines verified in the greater part of the countries in the world.
The main criticism pointed at these theories of demographic transition which try to
explain fertility declines is that they remain silent as to what concerns the role of a
country’s political environment and characteristics in affecting the individuals’ child-
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Figure 4 – Economic Development and Fertility Rates: 1972-2006
Notes: Variation corresponds to the total difference between 2006 and 1972. The red line
represents a fitted OLS line of the variation of the logarithm of CBR on the variation of the
logarithm of income per capita. The green line is fitted by a nonparametric regression using
the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing estimator (lowess). See the appendix table for data
definitions and sources.
bearing decisions by changing the societal risk and therefore contributing to explain
fertility declines.
Organski, Kugler, Johnson, and Cohen (1984) are among the first to propose that
fertility declines are not simply a result of modernization but rather can be triggered
by either economic or political institutions. These authors revealed that politically
capable governments are able to induce fertility declines even at the lowest levels
of social-economic development. Indirect effects of governmental activity on fertility
arise from transformation of the infrastructure, improvements in public health and
legislation that increases education and employment opportunities for women. Mason
(1997) points the importance of institutional, cultural and environmental constella-
tions to explain fertility transitions. More recently, Galor (2005) argues that the
different timings of the demographic transition reflects initial differences in several
factors, namely geographical and historical factors, and their impact in institutional,
cultural and demographic environments.
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Some empirical studies on the relation between political characteristics and fertility
behavior have been presented on the last decades. Feng, Kugler, and Zak (2000,
2001) proposed a formal dynamic model of politics and economic growth, embedded
in the microfoundations of decision making by government, firms and individuals.
The authors estimate a cross-country time-series regression model and find empirical
evidence that political stability and political capacity have a negative effect in fertility
rates, after taking into account the negative impact of income. Feng (2003) develops
a more parsimonious model which includes political freedom, political stability and
policy certainty as the main characteristics of the political systems which influence
decision makers. The author argues that these dimensions of political institutions
affect the individuals’ decisions by changing the opportunity cost of rearing children.
The empirical results show evidence supporting the propositions that countries that
are more free or more stable, and countries with less policy uncertainty display lower
fertility rates. Based on the theoretical framework proposed by Feng, Kugler, and Zak
(2001), Kugler and Swaminathan (2006) find that politics influence fertility choices
and determine the transmission of human capital from parents to children.
In sum, existing literature establishes a cross-sectional negative relationship be-
tween political development and fertility rates. However, these results do not establish
causation and are established ignoring very important issues. In this context, the main
contribution of this paper is the use of an appropriate estimation framework which
allows us to examine the existence of a causal relationship between democracy and
fertility rates.
But how does democracy contribute to change the opportunity cost of children,
thus influencing childbearing decisions?
2.1 Democracy, Dictatorship and Fertility
Przeworski (2004) finds that population grows faster under dictatorships than under
democracies because the former have higher birth rates6. According to Przeworski
(2004), under dictatorships women have on average 0.5 children more than under
democracies (Przeworski (2004)). ”Because their policies and their performance are
6This difference in birth rates is explained by higher fertility rather than by the age structure of
population.
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so unpredictable, they do not allow people to plan their lives, inducing households to
hoard the least risky asset, namely children”.
Democracy promotes regular public scrutiny and a meaningful opposition prevent-
ing policy-makers from power abuses and lowering the levels of corruption, red tape,
and other types of small groups’ favoritism. It promotes transparent rules and an
open debate over the choice of policies and policy-makers. Also, democracy substi-
tutes constitutional for non-constitutional transfers of power, thus hindering unpre-
dictable and violent power transfers, such as coups d’état, lowers uncertainty about
future policies and establishes a more stable environment. Furthermore, by enhancing
property rights and favoring contract enforcement democratic societies reduce uncer-
tainty about future returns from investments increasing investment in physical and
human capital7. Engerman, Mariscal, and Sokoloff (1999) and Wacziarg (1999) pro-
vide empirical evidence that democracy is positively associated with various measures
of human capital. This greater stability, confidence in institutions and protection of
investors promote economic growth and raise the opportunity cost of child care and
child rearing, lowering birth rates. North and Weingast (1989) argue that ”The more
likely it is that the sovereign will alter property rights for his or her own benefit, the
lower the expected returns from investment and the lower in turn the incentive to
invest. For economic growth to occur the sovereign or government must not merely
establish the relevant set of rights, but make a credible commitment to them.”
In this way, democracy tends to promote investment, namely in human capital,
by increasing educational opportunities and increasing female participation in the
labor market, therefore contributing to increase the relative cost of having children
and to lower fertility rates. Rodrik (1999) shows empirical evidence that democracies
pay higher wages. Heckman and Walker (1990) and Schultz (1997) study the role of
women’s wage on birth rates using Swedish data and find that increases in women’s
relative wage are an important determinant of Swedish fertility declines. Galor and
Weil (1996) propose a model focused on the effect of an increase in women’s relative
wage in lowering fertility, which is consistent with this empirical evidence. The authors
find that increases in women’s wage raise both household income and the price of
children, generating offsetting income and substitution effects on the demand for
7Rodrik (1998) presents empirical evidence supportive of the hypothesis that democracies produce
greater stability in economic performance.
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children. Higher wages for women increase less the household income than they raise
the opportunity cost of children, leading couples to choose to have less children8.
All in all, democracy, measured as the individuals’ capacity to freely exert their
options, favors economic performance improvement and human capital accumulation
increasing the relative returns to work when compared with child rearing, and raising
the opportunity cost of having an additional child.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this study, we use a panel of 100 countries for the period comprised between 1972
and 2006. The two employed measures of fertility are from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) database: the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and the Crude Birth Rate
(CBR). The former measures the number of children that would be born to a woman
if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance
with current age-specific fertility rates. The latter indicates the number of live births
occurring during the year per 1,000 people estimated at midyear. We will use the
CBR as the dependent variable since this measure considers the country’s structure
of population. The two variables are highly correlated and the estimation results using
either of the two measures as dependent variable are very similar9.
We follow the existing literature and define democracy according to Gastil’s (1986-
1987 ed., page 7) definition of political rights. ”Political rights are rights to participate
meaningfully in the political process. In a democracy this means the right of all
adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have
a decisive vote on public policies”. Therefore, countries with free and fair elections,
in which those who are elected rule and opposition plays a meaningful role, and
where individuals can freely exert their options, are considered democracies. We use
the Freedom House Political Rights Index which is precisely based on this definition
8According to their model: increases in the capital/labor ratio raise the relative wages of women
which leads women to substitute out of child rearing and into labor market; both higher wages and
lower fertility increase the level of capital per worker; this effect amplifies the increase in output
due to lower fertility and higher female participation in labor markets and is likely to accelerate the
demographic transition process. This may lead to the enforcement of property rights and law due
to the abundance of capital thus becomes easier for women to enter the labor market.
9Estimation results using the variable TFR as dependent variable are reported in the appendix
tables 7 and 8.
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in order to ”measure” democracy. The basis for this indicator is a yearly survey,
which evaluates political institutions in each country, based on the freedom to elect
representatives and the existence of a meaningful opposition (Freedom House, 1972-
2006). This index ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the freest countries, say
Sweden, and 7 the less free countries, say Libya. We transform the democracy index
to range from 0 (full autocracy) to 1 (country with fully developed institutions).
The GDP per capita (in PPP) is from The Penn World Table 6.1. Other vari-
ables are discussed later, once introduced in the analysis. A detailed description of
the variables and sources can be found in the Appendix Table A1. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics for the main variables. This table reports means, standard devi-
ations, minimum and maximum statistics and also the total number of observations,
correspondent to the sample used in the baseline estimation. Table 2 is a table of
simple correlations of the main variables included in the estimation. Notice the high
correlation between democracy and the logarithm of income per capita, as well as the
negative correlation between democracy and the indicators of fertility.
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean (Standard Deviation) Minimum Maximum Observations
Log CBR 3.252 (0.52) 2.041 4.049 3484
Log TFR 1.255 (0.559) 0.077 2.166 3475
Log GDP per capita 8.593 (1.157) 5.032 11.248 3483
Democracy 0.524 (0.374) 0 1 3471
Notes: The sampling period goes from 1972 to 2006. For detailed data definitions and sources
see the Appendix Table A1.
4 Econometric Model
4.1 Model Specification and Estimation
Consider the following dynamic regression model specified to assess the empirical
causal relation between democracy and birth rates:
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Table 2 – Correlation matrix for the main variables
Variable Log CBR Log TFR Democracy Log GDP per capita
Log CBR 1.0000
Log TFR 0.9845 1.0000
Democracy -0.6332 -0.6301 1.0000
Log GDP per capita -0.8319 -0.8127 0.5970 1.0000
Notes: The sampling period goes from 1972 to 2006. For detailed data definitions and sources
see the Appendix Table A1.
yit = γyit−1 + δdit−1 + x
′
it−1β + αi + εit (1)
where yit is the logarithm of CBR for country i in year t. The lagged value of this
variable is included in the right-hand side in order to capture the high persistence
in CBR. The variable dit−1 is the lagged value of the democracy index and is the
variable of primary interest in this study. The parameter δ measures the causal
effect of democracy in birth rates. The vector xit−1 includes lagged time-varying
political and economic variables that constitute potential covariates and β is a vector
of coefficients, which is assumed to be constant across countries. Additionally, the
term αi denotes a full set of country fixed effects and εit is a zero mean disturbance
term capturing all other omitted factors. Country fixed effects are included in the
model to account for the time-invariant country characteristics that affect birth rates.
In the model specification which constitutes the basis for the analysis the vector
xit−1 includes a control for the modernization theory, the logarithm of the GDP per
capita. The right-hand-side variables are included in the regression lagged by one
period. We argue that parents adjust to the political environment adopting a sequen-
tial decision-making strategy that takes time to occur. Parents respond to changes in
the political environment and adjust the family size contingent on that. The contem-
poraneous effect reflects decisions taken in the recent past, given the changes in the
political environment.
The regression analysis most commonly used in the literature is the pooled OLS
ignoring the high correlation of CBR over time and without including country fixed
effects. A pooled OLS approach, assumes that αi is iid [0, σ
2] and hence that it is
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uncorrelated with the regressors, leading to inconsistent parameter estimates if there
is correlation. The specification of this regression is identical to equation (1) except
for the omission of the lagged CBR (i.e., the γyit−1) and the country-specific effects
(i.e., the αi’s). Given the inertia in the CBR it is crucial to estimate a dynamic model
which accounts for the high correlation of CBR over time in order to disentangle and
better understand which factors influence childbearing decisions over time.
A well known result in econometrics is that OLS estimation of a dynamic regression
model leads to inconsistent estimation of the parameters γ, δ and β since the regressor
yit−1 is correlated with the random effect αi and therefore with the composite error
term (αi + εit). Let x
j
it−1 denote the jth component of the vector xit−1 and Cov(.)
denote the covariance between the two variables. A special feature of the within
estimator is that it yields consistent estimates in the fixed effects model even if these
covariances are different from zero as long as Cov(dit−1, εit) = Cov(x
j
it−1, εit) = 0 for
all j, as T converges to ∞.
The fixed effects panel approach is of particular relevance in this study given the
potential for political, social, cultural and historical omitted factors underlying both
equilibrium political institutions, birth rates and economic development. This ap-
proach is attractive since it allows to establish causation under weaker assumptions
than the ones required by the cross-sectional analysis as explained above. Neverthe-
less, some assumptions are required and a key assumption is that the unobservables
αi are time-invariant.
Furthermore, the fixed effects model has important weaknesses that must be taken
into account, besides the impossibility of estimation of the coefficients of any time-
invariant regressor. First, by construction, yit−1 is correlated with uis for s < t
which causes the within estimator to be biased. Second, reverse causation of birth
rates on democracy would imply that Cov(dit−1, εit) 6= 0 and result in inconsistent
estimates. The estimation strategy we propose to deal with the limitations of the
within estimator is the instrumental variables regression analysis. We use a measure
of the neighboring countries’ democratic capital proposed by Persson and Tabellini
(2006) as an exogenous source of variation for democracy. The estimation results from
IV estimation are presented in Section 6.
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5 Fixed Effects Estimation
5.1 Main Results
We start by estimating (1) and the main results are presented in Table 3.
The conventional specification is replicated in column (1) of Table 3. In this ap-
proach, a pooled OLS approach without controlling for time-invariant country-specific
effects and without modeling a dynamic structure is used. The results suggest a sig-
nificant negative relationship between democracy and birth rates as well as a negative
effect of the logarithm of income per capita on birth rates. More democratic countries
are predicted to have lower birth rates even after we control for the effect of income.
The results are also consistent with the modernization theory which says that coun-
tries with better standards of living have lower fertility rates. A 10 percent increase
in income per capita is associated with a 2.75 percent decrease in birth rates. In
contrast, the estimation results predict that an autocracy that becomes a democratic
country experiences a 40.2 percent decrease in birth rates, a considerable impact. In
the second column use lagged values of democracy and income per capita and augment
the basic model by introducing a lag of the logarithm of birth rates as a regressor.
The magnitude of its coefficient is very large and close to one (suggesting a unit root
process), and highly significant, which illustrates the strong degree of persistence in
CBR and the importance of modeling a dynamic structure in estimation. The results
change dramatically in magnitude and both democracy and income per capita become
statistically insignificant at conventional significance levels. Therefore, we don’t find
empirical evidence for a significant negative cross-country relation between democratic
development and birth rates once we account for the strong degree of persistence of
CBR. The same result applies in what concerns the cross-country negative relation
between income per capita and birth rates.
The third column of this table reports the fixed effects estimates consistent with
the model presented in (1). Once we control for the presence of long-lived country-
specific factors affecting birth rates and consider a dynamic model we find a significant
negative impact of democratic development in birth rates. A transition from a dicta-
torship to a democratic regime would cause birth rates to decrease by 0.59 percent,
approximately. The implied cumulative impact of democracy in birth rates (long
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Table 3 – Democracy and Birth Rates
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy -0.402***
(0.0919)
Log GDP per capita -0.275***
(0.0297)
Log CBRt−1 1.002*** 0.992*** 0.9562***
(0.0021) (0.0047) (0.0176)
Democracyt−1 0.0036 -0.0059** -0.0365***
(0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0101)
Log GDP per capitat−1 -0.0009 0.0076*** -0.0168*
(0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0104)
Implied Cumulative -1.5460 -0.7673* -0.8342***
effect of Democracy [0.2477] [0.0945] [0.0015]
Implied Cumulative 0.3858 0.9782 -0.3835***
effect of Income per capita [0.5651] [0.1910] [0.0036]
Sargan test [0.1234]
AR(2) test [0.8477]
Observations 3455 3345 3345 3245
R2 0.666 0.998 0.980
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of Crude Birth Rate and the sampling period
goes from 1972 to 2006. Pooled cross-sectional OLS regressions in columns (1) and (2) with
robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regression
results in column (3) with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at country
level in parentheses. Column (4) reports estimation results using the Arellano-Bond estimator
(see Arellano and Bond (1991)) with two lags used to instrument democracy and with robust
standard errors. The Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions and the p-value for
this test is in brackets. AR(2) is a test of serial correlation of order 2 that we reject at order 1
but do not reject at order 2, which is evidence of no serial correlation in the error term. The
implied cumulative effect of democracy on birth rates is obtained by democracyt−1/(1 − log
CBRt−1) and the same applies for the implied cumulative effect of income per capita. The
p-value given in brackets corresponds to a nonlinear test of the statistical significance of this
coefficient. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Detailed data definitions and sources given in
the appendix.
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term effect) which is given by -0.0059/(1-0.992)=-0.7673 is marginally statistically
significant. The estimates predict a significant even though small positive impact
of income per capita in birth rates which is not consistent with the modernization
theory. Nevertheless, the predicted long-run effect of income per capita is not statis-
tically significant. Overall, the statistical significance of the negative relation between
democracy and birth rates is robust to the introduction of country-specific fixed effects
and to modeling a dynamic structure, but the predicted impact is dramatically small
when compared with the results given in column (1), which replicates the results in
the literature.
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as a regressor in the model raises
several problems related with the pooled OLS and the within estimators. As Joshua
D. Angrist wrote in reply to a reader comment: ”So I say: ”You want to do fixed
effects? No lagged dependent variable, please (or at least be prepared to instrument
it if you include one). You want to control for lagged dependent variables? Then,
just do it!””10. Estimation of a dynamic model by pooled OLS, fixed effects or even
by random effects leads to inconsistent estimates of the parameters. Nickell (1981)
shows that standard OLS estimation methods lead to downward-biased coefficients
in dynamic models. This effects is commonly known as the ”dynamic panel bias”
or ”Nickel bias”. Consider the specific case of the within estimator (or fixed effects
estimator), which regresses (yit− ȳi) on (yit−1− ȳi) and (xit−1− x̄i). By construction
yit is correlated with the error term εit, so yit−1 is correlated with εit−1 and therefore
with ε̄i. And this implies that the regressor (yit−1 − ȳi) is correlated with (εit − ε̄i),
which is the error term of the previous regression.
This inconsistency of standard panel data estimators in the case of regressors
including a lagged dependent variable led to new microeconometric approaches that
we will use as estimation strategy.
Model (1) leads to the first-differences model
yit − yit−1 = γ(yit−1 − yit−2) + (xit−1 − xit−2)′β + (εit − εit−1), t = 3, ..., T (2)
10This is an answer to reader’s comment of the book by Angrist and Pischke (2008) on the website
www.mostlyharmlesseconometrics.com
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Handerson and Hsiao (1981) proposed estimating (2) using yit−2 as instrument for
(yit−1 − yit−2), since it is not correlated with (εit − εit−1), assuming the errors are
serially uncorrelated, and is correlated with (yit−1 − yit−2). Alternatively one can use
∆yit−2 as an instrument for ∆yit−1. Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a panel GMM
estimator using additional lags of the dependent variable as instruments. This method
is designed for models with a large N and a small T and has the particular advantage
of using the lagged values of the variables as instruments for themselves. This allows
the researcher to overcome the problem of finding a good (valid) instrument to use
in estimation. The GMM estimation has also the advantage of allowing us to test for
the validity of the overidentifying restrictions once it uses multiple instruments (the
most commonly used test is the Sargan test) and for serial correlation in the error
term. The AR(2) test for autocorrelation in the error term allows us to conclude
about further correlation in the error term. According to the model formulation in
(2) we expect to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at order 1 but not
at higher orders.
We use the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator and present the results in column
(4) of Table 3. The results in column (4) show empirical evidence for a significant
negative relation between democracy and birth rates. The short term and the long
term effects of democracy in birth rates are statistically significant. According to the
estimates, a full development of institutions leads birth rates to decrease by approx-
imately 3.7 percent in the short term while the predicted impact in the long term
is equal to 83 percent, which is a quantitatively larger impact than that estimated
in column (3). Furthermore, income per capita appears as a negative determinant
of birth rates. A 10 percent increase in income per capita is associated with a 0.17
percent decrease in birth rates. The long-run effect of income per capita is equal to
-0.38 implying that a 10 percent increase in income per capita leads to a 3.8 percent
decrease in birth rates in the long term. The Sargan test results allow to conclude
that the multiple instruments are valid and the AR(2) test results allow to reject the
null hypothesis of serial correlation at order 1 but not at higher order. These two
tests provide empirical robustness to the estimates by validating the instruments used
in the GMM estimation.
Overall, these results show robust empirical evidence for a causal relationship
between democratic development and birth rates. The magnitude of the impact is
18
well below the one predicted by standard regressions in the literature.
5.2 Robustness
In this section we analyze the sensitivity of our results to two modifications of the
model. Firstly, we will examine the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of
additional covariates in the regressions. And secondly, we will use an alternative
measure of democracy from the Polity IV database and investigate the robustness of
the estimates.
5.2.1 Sensitivity to the introduction of additional covariates
In this section we investigate how the relationship between democracy and birth rates
is influenced by the introduction of other covariates in the regressions. The new
covariates include a measure of human capital from Persson and Tabellini (2006)
constructed by interpolating the five-year observations from Barro and Lee (2000)
on the years of schooling of the population above 25 years of age, and a measure of
female labor market participation from the World Development Indicators database.
The labor force participation rate is the proportion of female population ages 15 and
older that is economically active. Table 4 investigates the sensitivity of our results to
the introduction of these additional covariates.
Columns (1) and (4) include human capital, columns (2) and (5) include female la-
bor market participation and columns (3) and (6) include both variables in estimation.
We present both fixed effects and GMM estimates.
The fixed effects estimates show that once human capital and female labor market
participation are included in the estimation the relationship between democracy and
birth rates disappears and becomes statistically insignificant. In this specification,
female labor market participation is not statistically significant while human capital
is highly significant. According to column (3) an additional year of schooling of the
population above 25 years of age is predicted to decrease birth rates by 5.64 percent.
In the GMM specification, the variable human capital is always statistically signif-
icant as well as female labor market participation. The relationship between democra-
tization and birth rates vanishes once we introduce human capital in the regressions.
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Table 4 – Democracy and Birth Rates: Introduction of Additional Covariates
FE FE FE AB AB AB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log CBRt−1 0.959*** 0.981*** 0.943*** 0.5828*** 0.8364*** 0.5755***
(0.0134) (0.0062) (0.0169) (0.0666) (0.0489) (0.0825)
Democracyt−1 -0.0050 -0.0033 0.0013 -0.0069 -0.0241*** -0.0043
(0.0044) (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0085) (0.0042)
Log GDP pct−1 0.0093** 0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0103 -0.0035
(0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0136) (0.0069)
Human Capitalt−1 -0.0386*** -0.0564*** -0.3281*** -0.3123***
(0.0106) (0.0133) (0.0562) (0.0734)
Labor Partt−1 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0086*** -0.0037**
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0016)
Implied Cumulative -0.1205 -0.1717 0.0224 -0.0166 -0.1473*** -0.0100
effect of Democracy [0.2388] [0.3447] [0.7782] [0.1550] [0.0005] [0.2568]
Implied Cumulative 0.2253 0.0423 -0.0201 -0.0007 -0.0631 -0.0083
effect of Income pc [0.1087] [0.8704] [0.8446] [0.9638] [0.4099] [0.6055]
Sargan test [0.2099] [0.0617] [0.0954]
AR(2) test [0.3283] [0.9883] [0.5067]
Observations 2297 2577 1677 2214 2477 1595
R2 0.969 0.973 0.957
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of Crude Birth Rate and the sampling period
goes from 1972 to 2000. Fixed Effects estimation results in columns (1), (2), and (3), with
robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. Arellano-Bond GMM estimates
in columns (4), (5) and (6), with robust standard errors. We instrument for Crude Birth Rate
using a double lag. The Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions and the p-value for
this test is in brackets. AR(2) is a test of serial correlation of order 2 and we reject at order 1 but
do not reject at order 2, which is evidence of no serial correlation in the error term. The implied
cumulative effect of democracy on birth rates is obtained by democracyt−1/(1 − log CBRt−1)
and the same applies for the implied cumulative effect of income per capita. The p-value given in
brackets correspond to a nonlinear test of the statistical significance of this coefficient. *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Detailed data definitions and sources given in the appendix.
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This relationship is not affected by the introduction of female labor market participa-
tion alone in the estimation. According to the estimates reported in column (6) one
additional year of schooling is associated with a 31.2 percent decrease in birth rates
while a 1 percentage point increase in female labor market participation is associated
with a 0.37 percent decrease in birth rates. These results may mean that the effect of
democracy, if it exists, works mainly through human capital accumulation.
Overall, democracy seems to affect birth rates mainly through human capital ac-
cumulation. This result is consistent with the mechanism proposed by Galor (2005)
based on the role of human capital accumulation in explaining fertility declines.
5.2.2 Sensitivity to an alternative measure of democracy
In this section we will use the Polity Composite Index as an alternative measure of
democracy. This index results from subtracting the Polity Autocracy Index from
the Polity Democracy Index and originally ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to
10 (strongly democratic)11. The Polity Democratic Index and the Polity Autocracy
Index are derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief
executive. Both indexes range from 0 to 10.
Table 5 investigates the robustness of our findings to the introduction of the Polity
Composite index to measure democracy.
Columns (1)-(4) report fixed effects estimates and columns (5)-(8) report GMM
estimates of several specifications. The estimates in columns (1) and (5) correspond
to the estimation of (1) which constitutes the baseline model. The variable democ-
racy, as measured by the Polity Composite Index, is statistically significant in both
columns even though the magnitude of the short term impacts is higher in the GMM
specification. According to the results in column (5) a full transition from dictatorship
to democracy would cause birth rates to decrease by 8.7 percent.
Once human capital and female labor market participation are introduced in the
regressions the statistical significance of the estimates change in the same way as
when using the Freedom House Political Rights Index to measure democracy. The
11We normalize the Polity Composite Index to range from 0(strongly autocratic) to 1(strongly
democratic).
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short term causal effect of democracy in birth rates is not robust to the introduction
of human capital in the fixed effects estimation. The short term relationship between
democratization and birth rates also vanishes once human capital and female labor
market participation are jointly introduced in the GMM specification. The long term
impact of democratization in birth rates is statistically significant in almost all spec-
ifications. According to the estimates presented in column (6) full democratization is
associated a 2.71 percent decrease in birth rates in the long term after controlling for
income per capita, human capital and female labor market participation.
The main conclusion from these results is the robustness of our findings to the
introduction of the Polity Composite Index as an alternative measure for democracy.
6 Instrumental Variables Estimation
When discussing the estimation strategies to be adopted in order to estimate the
causal effect of democracy on birth rates we pointed the importance of exogenous
sources of variation in estimation.
In this section we account for the serious possibility that democracy is endoge-
nous in equation (1) and suggest an instrument for this variable. The possibility of
endogeneity is empirically testable. We use the Hausman test for endogeneity by
estimating the following augmented OLS regression:
yit = γyit−1 + δdit−1 + ρd̂it−1 + x
′
it−1β + αi + εit (3)
where d̂it−1 is the predicted value of the endogenous regressor from reduced form
regression of dit−1 on the instrument fit−1 and on the other exogenous variables.
Hausman (1978) showed that we can test whether ρ = 0 in (3) since evidence for
correlation between εit and dit−1 would be given by statistical significance of trans-
formations of dit−1 such as d̂it−1. The results of the Hausman test for endogeneity
reported in Table 9 suggest empirical evidence that democracy is endogenous is our
model since we reject the null hypothesis of ρ = 0 for all significance levels in both
specifications.
Persson and Tabellini (2006) constructed a measure of a country’s democratic
capital based on the nation’s historical experience of democracy and a measure of the
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foreign, neighboring countries’ democratic capital. The measure of the neighborhood
democratic capital is based in a geographic definition of closeness and a continuous
measure of democracy based on Polity IV data. It consists of a weighted average of the
continuous variable polity2 in neighboring countries and the weights are the distances
between capitals. The variable polity2 considers six aspects of political institutions
focusing on executive powers, executive selection and the freedom of elections, and
ranges from -10 to 10.
Specifically, for country i and year t, the authors define foreign democratic capital,
fi,t, by
f(ρ)i,t =
∑
j 6=i
(1− aj,t)$(ρ)i,jt
where aj,t is a measure of the degree of democracy in country j in year t, $(ρ)
i,j
t
are the weights which fall with the distance between i and j and drops to zero for
distance outside the radius ρ. The authors replace (1−aj,t) by country’s j ’s continuous
polity2 score and divide by 10, such that the resulting expression is scaled from 0 to
1. Therefore, fi,t measures a country’s ”closeness of democracy” given the prevalence
of democracy in neighboring countries.
We expect the democratic capital of neighboring countries to influence positively
the domestic democratic capital of a country. As proposed by these authors, ”it is
easy to imagine how experience with democracy in foreign, neighboring countries could
spill over into greater domestic appreciation of democracy and greater willingness to
defend these values; think about the orange revolution in the Ukraine”.
We argue that democracy is endogenous in our model and suggest to use instru-
mental variables as estimation strategy to deal with this problem.
To analyze the impact of democracy on birth rates using an instrumental variables
approach we use two main specifications, with and without GMM.
The first stage equation for democracy in regression (1) is the following:
dit = αi + γfit + x
′
itβ + εit (4)
where fit represents the instrument foreign democratic capital for country i at time
t. In this case, the condition Cov(fit, εit|xit, αi) = 0, where εit represents the residual
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error term in the second stage equation, is crucial for identification.
The first-stage results suggest a strong relation between democracy and foreign
democratic capital. For example, the first-stage results for the regression in column
(2) of Table 6 (within variation case) yield a coefficient of approximately 0.27 with a
t-statistic close to 2.6.
Table 6 reports the estimates for three estimation strategies using the two mea-
sures of democracy. The first is the standard 2SLS regression, the second is the fixed
effects 2SLS regression, and the third is the Arellano-Bond GMM regression. The es-
timates suggest a statistically significant negative impact of democracy in birth rates
in all specifications and using either of the two measures of democracy. We also find
a statistically significant long term effect of democracy in birth rates. The results
in columns (1) and (4) suggest a significant negative cross-sectional relation between
birth rates and democracy. According to column (2), an autocratic country that expe-
riences a full development of institutions is estimated to have a decrease in birth rates
of 16.4 percent, approximately. The magnitude of the short term effect of democracy
in birth rates using the Polity Composite Index as democracy measure is smaller. Ac-
cording to column (5) a country that experiences a full transition from dictatorship
to democracy verifies a decrease of 5.8 percent in birth rates. The estimated impacts
using the GMM procedure are reported in columns (3) and (6). The estimated long
term effect of a full development of institutions in column (3) is associated with a
decrease in birth rates given by -0.034/(1-0.8960)=-0.3312*100 percent. This implied
effect of democracy in the long term is highly statistically significant. The GMM es-
timates suggest a higher impact of democratization in birth rates. A transition from
dictatorship to democracy implies a 7.54 percent decrease in birth rates in the short
term and a 50.06 percent decrease in the long term.
Overall, the predicted impact of democratization in birth rates is strong and robust
to the introduction of country-specific fixed effects.
In 2006 the Freedom House Political Rights Index attributed the lowest rating of
institutional development to Libya (dictatorship) and the CBR in Libya was 23.752
in that year (the CBR in Sweden in 2006 was 11.664). Given the estimates reported
in column (3) the predicted short term reduction in birth rates implied by Libyan
full development of institutions would be equal to 0.82 which is quantitatively small
if we consider the gap between Libya and Sweden for example. In contrast, the long
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Table 6 – Democracy and Birth Rates: IV Estimation
Freedom House Measure Polity IV Measure
2SLS FE 2SLS AB 2SLS FE 2SLS AB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log CBRt−1 0.981*** 0.931*** 0.8960*** 0.986*** 0.964*** 0.8494***
(0.0148) (0.0142) (0.0370) (0.0063) (0.0112) (0.0619)
Democracyt−1 -0.0629** -0.164*** -0.0344*** -0.0398*** -0.0580*** -0.0754**
(0.0295) (0.0300) (0.0097) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.0293)
Log GDP pct−1 0.0041 0.0114*** -0.0277* -0.0003 -0.0083 -0.0924***
(0.0032) (0.00341) (0.0155) (0.0016) (0.0051) (0.0340)
Implied Cumulative -3.2375*** -2.3741*** -0.3312*** -2.7462*** -1.5887*** -0.5006***
effect of Democracy [0.0095] [0.0000] [0.0004] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Implied Cumulative 0.2083 0.1652*** -0.2668*** -0.0185 -0.2276*** -0.6134***
effect of Income pc [0.3682] [0.0034] [0.0083] [0.8669] [0.0062] [0.0000]
Sargan test [0.5078] [0.2311]
AR(2) test [0.8062] [0.4807]
Observations 2816 2816 3601 3799 3799 3601
R2 0.996 0.936 0.996 0.970
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of Crude Birth Rate and the sampling period
goes from 1972 to 2000. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation results in columns (1) and
(4), with robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. Fixed effects 2SLS
results in columns (2) and (5) with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at
country level in parentheses. Arellano-Bond GMM estimates in columns (3) and (6) with robust
standard errors. Democracy is instrumented in the first differenced equation with differenced
foreign democratic capital. The Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions and the p-
value for this test is in brackets. AR(2) is a test of serial correlation of order 2 and we reject at
order 1 but do not reject at order 2, which is evidence of no serial correlation in the error term.
The implied cumulative effect of democracy on birth rates is obtained by democracyt−1/(1− log
CBRt−1) and the same applies for the implied cumulative effect of income per capita. The
p-value given in brackets correspond to a nonlinear test of the statistical significance of this
coefficient. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Detailed data definitions and sources given in
the appendix.
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term effect of political development in birth rates may be considerable. Full political
development in Libya would cause a decrease of 7.77 in CBR, closing the gap between
the two countries.
Empirical results concerning the impact of income per capita in birth rates appear
with the ”wrong” sign in columns (1) and (2). In column (3) an increase in income
per capita is associated with a significant decrease in birth rates, but the impact is
small. A 10 percent increase in income per capita leads to a decrease of 0.3 percent in
birth rates. These results contribute to the inconclusive empirical literature regarding
the sign of the relationship between income and birth rates.
7 Conclusion
The theories of demographic transition ignore the role of political institutions in ex-
plaining fertility declines. Standard regressions to explain the relationship between
fertility rates and institutions in the literature do not account for the strong persis-
tence in CBR, the possibility of relevant unobserved characteristics which are likely to
be correlated with the exogenous regressors or to the possibility of reverse causation.
The political economy literature has pointed to the importance of cultural values,
traditions, institutionalization, and ideologies in explaining democratization. These
factors are also likely to influence birth rates. Therefore, changes in democracy and
changes in birth rates may be driven by a third variable, which may be time-variant
or time-invariant.
In this paper we look for a causal link between democracy and birth rates using two
strategies: the first is the inclusion of country-specific effects in the estimation in order
to control for time-invariant omitted factors, and the second is the use instrumental
variables estimation, by using the democratic capital of the neighbors as an exogenous
source of variation for democracy.
All in all, we find empirical evidence which supports a significant negative causal
relationship between democracy and fertility that is robust to the introduction of
fixed effects and to a dynamic model structure. We used the democratic capital of the
neighbors as an instrument for a country’s democracy and find significant evidence
that changes in democracy are negatively associated with changes in birth rates. A
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country that becomes more democratic is likely to have lower birth rates, holding the
other country characteristics constant. Therefore, political development constitutes an
additional mechanism to explain fertility declines experienced worldwide. This result
may have important policy implications. Politicians may affect fertility rates and the
population size by better securing property rights and ensuring contract enforcement
or creating incentives for female labor market participation, for example.
A well established result in the economic growth literature says that fertility rates
are a negative determinant of long-run economic growth. In this way, politicians have
an additional instrument that has been over looked to escape a Malthusian trap or
to promote further economic development by directly affecting birth rates and the
population size.
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Table 7 – Democracy and Fertility Rates
Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy -0.473***
(0.112)
Log GDP per capita -0.273***
(0.0369)
Log TFRt−1 1.001*** 0.993*** 0.9851***
(0.00212) (0.00472) (0.0083)
Democracyt−1 0.00512* -0.00579 -0.0237***
(0.00302) (0.00356) (0.0071)
Log GDP per capitat−1 0.0197*** 0.0122*** 0.0122***
(0.00123) (0.00338) (0.0042)
Implied Cumulative -6.2401 -0.87752 -1.5862**
effect of Democracy [0.6777] [0.1500] [0.0229]
Implied Cumulative 0.3420 2.9895 0.8178
effect of Income per capita [0.8697] [0.1876] [0.1539]
Sargan test [0.2340]
AR(2) test [0.7890]
Observations 3446 3329 3329 3223
R2 0.630 0.998 0.989
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of Total Fertility Rate and the sampling period
goes from 1972 to 2006. Pooled cross-sectional OLS regressions in columns (1) and (2) with
robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regression
results in column (3) with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at country
level in parentheses. Column (4) reports estimation results using the Arellano-Bond estimator
(see Arellano and Bond (1991)) with two lags used to instrument democracy and with robust
standard errors. The Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions and the p-value for this
test is in brackets. AR(2) is a test of serial correlation of order 2 that we reject at order 1 but
do not reject at order 2, which is evidence of no serial correlation in the error term. The implied
cumulative effect of democracy on birth rates is obtained by democracyt−1/(1 − log TFRt−1)
and the same applies for the implied cumulative effect of income per capita. The p-value given in
brackets corresponds to a nonlinear test of the statistical significance of this coefficient. *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Detailed data definitions and sources given in the appendix.
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Table 8 – Democracy and Fertility Rates: IV Estimation
Freedom House Measure Polity IV Measure
2SLS FE 2SLS AB 2SLS FE 2SLS AB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log TFRt−1 0.985*** 0.964*** 0.9314*** 0.993*** 0.995*** 0.955***
(0.0188) (0.0083) (0.0247) (0.00724) (0.00534) (0.0273)
Democracyt−1 -0.0508 -0.114*** -0.0318*** -0.0293* -0.0206** -0.0425**
(0.0476) (0.0228) (0.0088) (0.0169) (0.00861) (0.0175)
Log GDP pct−1 0.00392 0.0214*** 0.0054 0.000299 0.00173 -0.0548***
(0.0032) (0.0026) (0.0076) (0.00156) (0.00308) (0.0175)
Implied Cumulative -3.3355** -3.1289*** -0.4644*** -3.9614 -4.1351 -0.9473***
effect of Democracy [0.0101] [0.0000] [0.0007] [0.0481] [0.1654] [0.0023]
Implied Cumulative 0.2570 0.5891*** 0.0792 0.0404 0.3482 -1.2220***
effect of Income pc [0.3491] [0.0001] [0.5264] [0.8523] [0.7107] [0.0023]
Sargan test [0.3677] [0.2892]
AR(2) test [0.9290] [0.4341]
Observations 2803 2803 3588 3790 3790 3588
R2 0.997 0.974 0.997 0.987
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of Total Fertility Rate and the sampling period
goes from 1972 to 2000. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation results in column (1), with
robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. Fixed effects 2SLS results
in column (2) with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at country level
in parentheses. Arellano-Bond GMM estimates in column (3) with robust standard errors.
Democracy is instrumented in the first differenced equation with differenced foreign democratic
capital. The Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions and the p-value for this test
is in brackets. AR(2) is a test of serial correlation of order 2 and we reject at order 1 but do
not reject at order 2, which is evidence of no serial correlation in the error term. The implied
cumulative effect of democracy on birth rates is obtained by democracyt−1/(1 − log TFRt−1)
and the same applies for the implied cumulative effect of income per capita. The p-value given in
brackets correspond to a nonlinear test of the statistical significance of this coefficient. *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Detailed data definitions and sources given in the appendix.
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Table 9 – Hausman Test for Endogeneity
2SLS Fixed Effects 2SLS
(1) (2)
Log CBRt−1 0.980*** 0.931***
(0.00675) (0.0151)
Democracyt−1 0.00477* -0.00491
(0.00243) (0.00384)
̂Democracyt−1 -0.0697*** -0.161***
(0.0192) (0.0317)
Log GDP pct−1 0.00417** 0.0113***
(0.00176) (0.00321)
Observations 2816 2816
R2 0.998 0.973
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of Crude Birth Rate and the sampling period
goes from 1972 to 2000. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation results in column (1), with
robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. Fixed effects 2SLS results in
column (2) with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at country level in
parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Detailed data definitions and sources given in
the appendix.
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Table A1 Data Description and Sources
Variable Description Source
Democracy Refers to political freedom and is measured
using the Freedom House Index of Political
Rights and provides a measure of the extent of
democracy in a given country. Political rights
are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with
one representing the highest degree of Free-
dom and seven the lowest, here normalized
from 0 to 1, with 1 representing fully devel-
oped democratic institutions
The source of these data is the
Freedom House (1972-2006)
Polity Composite
Index
Computed by subtracting the autocracy score
from the democracy score. This index ranges
from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly
democratic) and is normalized to range from
0 (strongly autocratic) to 1 (strongly demo-
cratic).
Polity IV Project (1960-2006)
Crude birth rate Indicates the number of live births occurring
during the year, per 1,000 population esti-
mated at midyear
World Bank (1960-2006)
Foreign Democratic
Capital
Defined by Persson and Tabellini (2006) and
also normalized from 0 to 1. It is the weighted
average of the continuous variable polity2 in
neighboring countries, taken from PolityIV
dataset. The weights correspond to the dis-
tance between capitals.
Persson and Tabellini (2006)
GDP per capita Measured as logarithm of GDP per capita ad-
justed for purchasing power parity.
Penn World Table 6.3 by Heston,
Summers, and Aten (2009)
Human Capital Years of schooling os the population above 25
years of age. Interpolation of five-year obser-
vations from Persson and Tabellini (2006).
Persson and Tabellini (2006), ?
Labor Participation Labor force participation rate is the propor-
tion of the female population ages 15 and older
that is economically active.
World Bank (1980-2006)
Total fertility rate Represents the number of children that would
be born to a woman if she were to live to the
end of her childbearing years and bear chil-
dren in accordance with current age-specific
fertility rates.
World Bank (1960-2006)
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Table A2 Countries included in the sample
Country
Albania Guatemala Mozambique Turkey
Algeria Guinea Netherlands Uganda
Angola Guyana New Zealand United Arab Emirates
Argentina Haiti Nicaragua United Kingdom
Australia Honduras Niger United States
Austria Hungary Nigeria Uruguay
Belgium Iceland Norway Vietnam
Bolivia India Pakistan Yemen Rep.
Brazil Indonesia Panama Zambia
Bulgaria Iran Paraguay Zimbabwe
Burkina Faso Iraq Peru
Cameroon Ireland Philippines
Canada Italy Poland
Chile Ivory Coast Portugal
China Jamaica Romania
Colombia Japan Saudi Arabia
Congo Rep. Jordan Senegal
Congo Dem. Rep Kenya Sierra Leone
Costa Rica Korea Rep. Singapore
Cuba Lebanon Somalia
Denmark Liberia South Africa
Dominican Republic Libya Spain
Ecuador Luxembourg Sudan
Egypt Arab Rep Madagascar Sweden
El Salvador Malawi Switzerland
Finland Malaysia Syrian Arab Republic
France Mali Tanzania
Gabon Mexico Thailand
Ghana Mongolia Togo
Greece Morocco Trinidad and Tobago
36
